Abstract-In this paper, we consider the problem of cooperative spectrum sensing scheduling (C3S) in a cognitive radio network (CRN) when there exist multiple primary channels. Our work focuses on a scenario in which each secondary user (SU) has the freedom to decide whether to participate in cooperative spectrum sensing; if not, the SU becomes a free rider. Such a mechanism can conserve the energy for spectrum sensing at a risk of sacrificing the spectrum sensing performance. To overcome this problem, we address the following two questions: "Which action (contributing to spectrum sensing or not) should be taken?" and "which channel should be sensed?" We model our framework as an evolutionary game in which each SU makes its decision based on its utility history and takes an action more frequently if it brings a relatively higher utility. We also develop a coalition formation algorithm based on the channel status, where each SU always chooses the coalition that brings the most information regarding the status of the corresponding channel. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can guarantee the detection probability at a low false alarm rate. The results also indicate that our algorithm can satisfy different requirements by carefully tuning the system parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
PECTRUM sensing has become an essential function in cognitive radio networks (CRNs) for secondary users (SUs) to identify the temporarily unused/underutilized licensed spectrum bands and to protect the transmissions of the primary users (PUs). Due to the uncertainty factors that resulted from channel randomness such as shadowing and fading, the detection performance of spectrum sensing may be significantly compromised. Fortunately, the uncertainty problems can be mitigated by allowing the spatially dispersed SUs to cooperate and collaboratively make a decision regarding the status of the licensed bands [1] . This procedure is termed cooperative spectrum sensing, which has recently been actively studied in [2] - [6] due to its attractive performance.
The existing literature mainly focuses on a typical scenario where all the SUs contribute to spectrum sensing. However, in reality, it might be unnecessary for each SU to perform spectrum sensing at every time slot, as long as the sensing performance meets certain requirements. Moreover, SUs in emerging mobile and ad hoc applications may selfishly behave, trying not to contribute in spectrum sensing if possible, as spectrum sensing consumes energy. However, if an insufficient number of SUs participate in spectrum sensing, the sensing performance may not be guaranteed, which may result in poor throughput for all the SUs. Therefore, it is of great importance to study the dynamic behaviors of selfish users in cooperative spectrum sensing.
We propose a novel cooperative framework, in which SUs can decide whether to participate in spectrum sensing or do nothing to save their own energy [7] . This framework is modeled as an evolutionary game [8] , [9] , which provides excellent means to address the strategy uncertainty that a user/player may face when exploring different actions. For those SUs that do nothing, we take them as free riders that can eavesdrop on the final decisions about the status of the PUs. By making different choices, SUs can get different utilities determined by their achieved revenue/throughput and energy consumption. Each SU selects its action based on its utility history, and a rational user should choose a strategy more frequently if that strategy brings a higher utility.
Since there exist multiple primary channels, each contributing SU needs to determine which channel to sense. To answer this question, we propose a coalition formation algorithm, where an SU chooses to join the coalition that brings the most information about the channel status distribution. As a result, all the SUs sensing the same channel form a coalition to collaboratively make the final decision regarding the status of the primary channel. We introduce the formal measurement of the uncertainty of the channel status. Moreover, each contributing SU joins the coalition that results in the largest uncertainty reduction. This algorithm ensures that the contributing SUs autonomously collaborate and self-organize into disjoint coalitions, and the spectrum sensing of each channel is performed within the corresponding coalition independently.
Through an extensive simulation study, we assess the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of detection probability and false alarm probability for each channel. We also study the impact of the adjustable parameters on the SUs' contributing probability. Our results indicate that carefully tuning the adjustable parameters can help satisfy various requirements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of the related work in cooperative spectrum sensing. Section III presents our system model, and Section IV details the proposed cooperative spectrum sensing scheduling (C3S) scheme. How to derive the Nash equilibrium to predict the system status is introduced in Section V, and the simulation results are reported in Section VI. We summarize our work and conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Spectrum sensing [6] is a critical function in CRNs for efficiently identifying and exploiting the spectrum holes [10] and preventing harmful interference to PUs. However, the performance of spectrum sensing in practical application scenarios is often compromised by many factors, such as multipath fading, shadowing, and the receiver uncertainty problems [11] . To address these challenges, cooperative spectrum sensing [1] , [5] , [6] , [12] , [13] has been shown to be an effective method in enhancing the sensing performance. The results in [13] indicate that significant performance enhancements may be achieved through collaborations among the SUs. It is also argued in [12] that cooperative spectrum sensing may be the only mechanism to relieve the sensitivity requirements and hardware limitations of the sensing devices. A comprehensive survey of cooperative spectrum sensing is provided in [1] to address the issues of cooperation method, cooperative gain, and cooperation overhead. Spectrum sensing methodologies and algorithms are summarized in [5] and [6] , respectively. These state-of-the-art reviews present the design challenges and solutions of spectrum sensing from different angles.
Note that most of the current research focuses on a fully cooperative scenario where all the SUs participate in spectrum sensing and collaborate by sharing their sensing results through a centralized fusion center, which combines the sensing results via data fusion [14] and makes the final decision. However, a fully cooperative spectrum sensing scenario is not always necessary and practical. As argued in [15] , SUs may be selfish and tend to conserve energy for their own data transmissions by not participating in spectrum sensing. Although the approach proposed in [15] achieves better performance than having all SUs perform sensing when selfish users exist, the application scope is very narrow as it considers a single channel whose status is determined by the SUs with each sensing a subband of the channel, and the channel is claimed to be occupied by the PU if any subband is sensed busy.
On the other hand, although cooperative spectrum sensing among SUs can provide a more accurate detection of PU activities, more sensing cooperation may decrease the transmission time of SUs. To handle this tradeoff, Zhang et al. [16] , [17] investigated how many SUs should be assigned to sense each channel to maximize the energy efficiency, assuming that all SUs are willing to participate in spectrum sensing. A similar problem is addressed in [18] , in which the sensors performing the cooperative spectrum sensing are divided into a number of disjoint subsets such that only one subset of sensors is turned on at a period of time while others are put in sleep mode to extend the network lifetime.
In this paper, we tackle the problem of C3S for a CRN with multiple SUs and primary channels, where SUs may not be willing to participate in spectrum sensing. We define different utility functions to encourage the contributing SUs and punish the free riders and address the problems of which action (contributing or not) to take and which channel to sense by exploiting evolutionary game theory and channel-uncertaintybased coalition formation. Our scheme is distributed, efficient, and flexible. It can be applied to any network scenario and satisfy a wide range of requirements by tuning the adjustable parameters.
III. SYSTEM MODEL We consider a relatively small area covered by M primary (orthogonal) channels, which are denoted by M = {1, 2, . . . , M }, that can be shared by N SUs, which are denoted by N = {n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n N }. Here, a "primary channel" refers to a licensed spectrum band currently being utilized by a unique PU. Following the general assumptions on cooperative spectrum sensing, we assume that the system is time slotted. At each time slot, M primary channels are synchronously sensed. In this paper, we design an evolutionary game to help each SU decide on whether to participate in spectrum sensing or not and partition all the contributing SUs into M coalitions, with each sensing one channel. The decision is made by the coalition head based on a majority vote and is broadcast to all members in the same coalition. We assume that the users are selfish but not malicious. They may not participate in spectrum sensing to conserve their own energy but will not maliciously manipulate the sensing procedure. An illustration of coalition formation is presented in Fig. 1 . It separates the three coalitions geographically for the three channels, only for illustration purposes.
Note that our scheme can be easily generalized to the case when multiple PUs share the same channel in a large area by incorporating the mechanism proposed in [19] to enable each SU belonging to the same coalition to pick up a PU for spectrum sensing. A possible way is to choose the nearest PU.
The problem of spectrum sensing can be formulated as a binary hypothesis testing [13] , i.e., where x(t) is the signal received by the SU, s(t) is the PUs' transmitted signal, n(t) is the additive white Gaussian noise, and h is the amplitude gain of the channel. Here, H 0 and H 1 denote the hypothesis of the absence and presence, respectively, of the PU in the considered channel. In this paper, an energy detector [20] - [23] is chosen as the underlying spectrum sensing technique because of its simple design and low overhead. According to [24] , the received signal x(t) will be transformed into a normalized output Y by an energy detector. Then, Y is compared with a detection threshold θ to decide on whether the PU is present or not. More information on threshold determination can be found in [10] .
The performance of spectrum sensing can be primarily described by two basic metrics: detection probability denoting the probability that a PU is reported to be present when the spectrum is indeed occupied by the PU and false alarm probability denoting the probability that a PU is declared to be present when the spectrum is actually free.
To better analyze the performance of C3S, we start with the local (individual) energy detection. In a Rayleigh fading environment, the detection probability and false alarm probability of SU i detecting the status of PU/channel j are, respectively, given by P d,i,j and P f,i,j as follows [20] :
where Y i,j is the normalized output of SU i sensing the status of PU j, θ j is the detection threshold for PU j, m is the time-bandwidth product, and γ i,j denotes the average signalto-noise ratio of the received signal from the PU to the SU, which is defined as γ i,j = P j h j,i /σ 2 , with P j being the transmit power of PU j, σ 2 being the Gaussian noise variance, and h j,i = κ/d ν j,i being the path loss between PU j and SU i; here, κ is the path-loss constant, ν is the path-loss exponent, and d j,i is the distance between PU j and SU i. Note that Γ(., .) is the incomplete gamma function, and Γ(.) is the gamma function.
IV. UTILITY-BASED COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING SCHEDULING
There are two major stages in our C3S scheme. First, each SU decides on whether to be a contributor or a free rider based on their utility history. Second, each contributor makes a decision on which channel to sense, i.e., which coalition to join.
A. Which Action Should Be Taken?
In our model, each SU first makes its own decision on whether to contribute to sense or to do nothing as a free rider at each time slot. A free rider implies that the SU will go to sleep mode instead of conducting spectrum sensing and will become active for eavesdropping when all the contributors have finished spectrum sensing and the decision will be broadcast. For the users that contribute to spectrum sensing, they consume a certain amount of energy, and in exchange, they achieve certain benefit in other format, for example, revenue, which is related to the throughput in our consideration. We assume that to obtain an access opportunity, an SU should make a payment, which might be proportional to the access time and/or related to the access priority in a competitive environment. For free riders that tend to wait for others to sense and overhear others' sensing results to conserve more energy for their own data transmissions, their energy for sensing is certainly decreased, but they also take the risk of being fined heavily. If no user contributes to spectrum sensing or the number of contributing users is too small to guarantee the spectrum sensing performance, all SUs may receive a low throughput. Therefore, the goal of the SUs is to get more throughput with less energy used for spectrum sensing. Since there are two different choices (contributor or free rider), the SUs need to try different strategies at each time slot and learn the best strategy from their strategic interactions using the methodology of understanding-by-building.
We model this problem as an evolutionary game, which contains two kinds of players: the contributors (denoted by C) that participate in spectrum sensing and the free riders (denoted by F) that only overhear the spectrum sensing decisions of others. Then, the proposed cooperative sensing problem can be modeled by a game (N , U), with N being the set of players (the SUs) and U being the utility function or value of each player. Apparently, C F = N .
The utility function for a contributor C (C ∈ C) is given by
where R(C) is the revenue received by C, and E(C) is the cost in terms of energy consumed for spectrum sensing per time slot. Similarly, the utility function for a free rider F (F ∈ F) is defined as
where E(F ) is the return in terms of saved energy for not participating in spectrum sensing, and H(F ) is the punishment for not contributing. The values of R(C) and H(F ) are related to the spectrum sensing performance. We will introduce specific utility equations in the following section.
Assume that all the SUs are rational and selfish, and they are all interested in maximizing their own utilities. Each SU computes its own utility at each time slot and makes a decision on whether to be a contributor or a free rider based on the utility history for different actions. To decide which action to take, the SUs perform the following update algorithm. 1) Initially, each SU (each player) has two choices (C-contributor or F -free rider) and selects each choice with a probability of 50%. 2) At each time slot t
• each player n i selects the action e ∈ {C, F } with probability p n i (e, t); • each player computes the utility U n i (e, t) for the selection of action e at time slot t. 3) Each user n i approximates the average utility for action e within the past T time slots (including slot t), which can be expressed as U n i (e); each user n i also approximates the average utility of the mixed actions (all the actions) U n i in the past T slots. Note that if there are less than T − 1 slots in the past, all slots need to be considered. 4) The probability of user n i selecting the action e ∈ {C, F } for the next time slot can be computed as
with η n i being the step size of adjustment determined by n i . This function describes the dynamic process of selecting an action. The default minimum and maximum values of this probability are 0 and 1, respectively. Note that the sum of the probabilities for two different strategies is 1; hence, we only need to derive the probability for either C or F .
The intuition behind this algorithm can be stated as follows: If strategy e ∈ {C, F } results in a higher utility compared with the average utility obtained from the actions selected in the past, the probability of e being adopted in the next slot should grow, and the growth rate is expressed aṡ
Apparently, the growth rate is proportional to the difference between strategy e's current utility and the current average utility achieved by the mixed strategies selected in the past T slots. All the SUs target maximizing their utilities in terms of energy consumption and revenue/punishment, i.e., they intend to get more revenue/throughput with less energy consumption.
Since all the information needed to make a decision for each SU is its utility history, our algorithm is purely localized and distributed; thus, it scales well to large networks. By repeatedly playing this evolutionary game, the SUs can autonomously adapt to the environment changes resulted from user mobility and other factors.
B. Which Channel Should Be Sensed?
If an SU decides to be a contributor, it needs to pick one of the M primary channels to sense. Here, we answer the question "which channel to sense" by developing a channeluncertainty-based coalition formation algorithm. The basic idea lies in that each contributor joins a coalition that brings the most information on the corresponding channel's status distribution.
To derive channel uncertainty, we refer to the definition of entropy. Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random value. It usually refers to the Shannon entropy, which quantifies the expected value of the information in a message, usually in units such as bits [25] . The concept was introduced by Shannon in his 1948 paper [26] . The formal definition of entropy for a discrete random variable is as follows.
For a discrete random variable X with possible values x 1 , . . . , x n and probability mass function p(X), the entropy can be explicitly written as [27] 
The common values of b are 2, Euler's number e, and 10, and the unit of entropy is bit for b = 2, nat for b = e, and dit (or digit) for b = 10. In this paper, we take b = 2. In this paper, the random values are the statuses of each channel, i.e., the presence or absence of the PU in the considered channel, which is denoted by H 1 and H 0 , respectively. We denote this discrete random variable by X i for channel i, whose possible values are drawn from {x Thus, by referring to the entropy concept, we define the channel uncertainty in this paper as follows:
Channel uncertainty provides a perfect measure for our estimation accuracy about the channel status. According to the definition, the goal of our method is to reduce the channel uncertainty for each channel as much as possible when deciding which channel to sense for each player. Next, we derive the values of p i 1 and p i 2 . All the contributors in C need to be dispersed into the M channels. As stated in Section III, the SUs contributing to cooperative sensing for channel i form a coalition, which is denoted by S i c . Since each SU can only sense one channel at each time slot, the collection of the coalitions satisfies the following conditions:
The collection of the coalitions is called a partition of C. As time evolves, the contributor set and the partitions at different time slots change.
Since we employ a majority vote as our fusion rule, the final decision about channel i is busy if more than 50% of the nodes in S i c report that a PU is present. The same policy applies to false alarm. Then, we have
When there are k SUs from S i c that detect the presence of a PU and report H 1 , we say that the k SUs form 
Thus
where P d,n a ,i and P d,n b ,i denote the detection probabilities of coalition members n a and n b for channel i, whose values can be determined by (2) . Next, we derive the probability that channel i is idle. Let P i F denote the probability of the false alarm rate for channel i. For simplicity, we assume that the local false alarm probabilities computed by the SUs within the coalition for channel i are the same, which is denoted by P f,i . Therefore, after coalition fusion, the false alarm probability for channel i can be expressed as
Consequently
Apparently, we want the channel uncertainty to be as low as possible. Based on this fact, a new contributor should always choose the channel whose uncertainty can be reduced the most because of its participation. Let H(X i ) be the uncertainty of channel i with its current coalition members. If a new contributor n V joins, a new uncertainty H(X i , n V ) can be obtained by (8) . Apparently, a larger uncertainty difference
yields a more accurate estimation about the channel status. Thus, we propose to use the uncertainty difference to select the coalition that brings the most information on the channel's status. Formally, the uncertainty-based coalition selection algorithm can be elaborated as follows.
Step 1) Compute the uncertainty difference ΔH(n V ) = H(X i ) − H(X i , n V ) for the set M of candidate channels.
Step 2) Select channel i such that
After contributor n V joins the right coalition, it receives its revenue R(n V ), which is related to the uncertainty difference. Specifically, the larger the uncertainty reduction, the higher the R(n V ). By this rule, the contributors are encouraged to join the coalitions that bring the greatest uncertainty reduction to earn the largest revenue. However, it also consumes a certain amount of energy for spectrum sensing. Hence, we adopt the following utility function for contributor n V :
where ΔH(n V ) is the uncertainty reduction, μ is a predetermined parameter defining the value of the revenue, ξ is the energy consumption for spectrum sensing per time slot, and ω is used to transform per-unit energy consumption into equivalent expenditure. For free riders, although they conserve energy by not participating in spectrum sensing, they also suffer the penalty. In particular, when the detection performance is poor, the punishment could be heavy. In our consideration, we take the largest uncertainty of the M channels H max as the measurement of the detection performance. A larger uncertainty implies that more SUs are needed to contribute to spectrum sensing, and accordingly, free riders should be punished more heavily. In this paper, we assume that the utilities for all the free riders are the same, which are defined as follows:
where S(H max ) is a measurement of the degree of satisfaction with the detection performance, which can be modeled as a sigmoid function of the maximum uncertainty. In our consideration, the range of S(H max ) is between [0, 1]; then, the value of min{1, − log S(H max )} is between [0, 1]. Here, λ is a predetermined parameter defining the harshness of the penalty. We can see that when the detection performance is highly satisfied, the value of S(H max ) is close to 1; thus, the penalty is close to 0. On the other hand, when the detection performance is poorly satisfied, which means that the number of contributors is not enough to make an accurate decision, the value of the penalty is high enough to encourage the SUs to participate in spectrum sensing. Similar to (15) , ξ is the energy saved from spectrum sensing, and ω is used to transform perunit energy into equivalent revenue. The sigmoid function for the satisfaction degree of the detection performance is calculated as
where H is the predefined requirement for the uncertainty, and a decides on the steepness of the satisfactory curve. Fig. 2 is a demonstration of the sigmoid function with H = 0.5. We can see that a user has very limited satisfaction when the uncertainty is above a certain threshold, below which the satisfaction rapidly reaches an asymptotic value. Sigmoid functions [28] have been widely used to approximate a user's satisfaction with respect to service qualities.
We summarize our proposed algorithm in Algorithm 1.
2. ∀ n i ∈ N selects an action e with probability p n i (e, t). For each contributor S i ∈ C Calculates the uncertainty for each channel j; Selects channelĵ that brings in the largest uncertainty reduction; Receives the utility determined by (14) .
3. After each contributor joins a coalition, each free rider Gets the largest uncertainty of the M channels H max ; Receives the utility determined by (15).
4. Each user updates the probability of each action for the next time slot by (6) 5. t = t + 1, go to Step 2
V. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In general, the outcome of a player's decision depends not only on how it chooses among different options but also on the choices made by other players with whom it interacts. In this paper, an SU may choose to be a free rider when there are enough contributors doing spectrum sensing and convert to being a contributor when the system sensing performance is poor. This means that a player's behavior can be changed based on the environment to display a mixture of the two strategies. In other words, each strategy corresponds to a particular randomized choice over pure strategies. Specifically, the SUs have two pure strategies C (contributor) and F (free rider). A mixed strategy here corresponds to a probability p between 0 and 1, indicating that the SU adopts C with probability p and plays F with probability 1 − p. To predict the system status, we introduce the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1: The Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy-the system is in an equilibrium state, with no force pushing it toward a different outcome [29] , [30] .
Next, we derive the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Intuitively, each player wants its behavior to be unpredictable to the other so that its behavior cannot be taken advantage of. This notion of indifference is a general principle behind the computation of mixed-strategy equilibrium in two-player two-strategy games: Each player should randomize so as to make the other player indifferent between its two alternatives. A generalization of this principle applies to games with any finite number of players and any finite number of strategies [31] , [32] . For simplicity, we first analyze a two-player game for homogeneous players to gain some insight. The utilities of the two players are described in Fig. 3 . Since they are homogeneous players, they have the same utility for the same strategy. When both choose to be contributors (C), they get equal utilities V a . Similarly, they get V d for both being free riders (F ). If one of them chooses to be a contributor while the other chooses to be a free rider, the contributor gets V b , and the free rider gets V c .
When a player uses the mixed strategy p, we consider that the player chooses C with probability p. For (p, p) to be a mixed Nash equilibrium, it must make the two players indifferent between their two pure strategies so that the expected utilities from playing C and F are equal. When the other player is using strategy p, the expected utility for playing C is V a p + V b (1 − p), whereas the expected utility for playing
, we can get p, which is the mixed Nash equilibrium.
Differently, the players in this paper are heterogeneous. The utilities for different strategies are related to the system performance. However, the system performance is affected by many random factors, such as the number of contributing nodes, and different sets of contributors. Moreover, the performance is changing over time, and the utilities for different nodes can be different even if they are playing the same strategy. Therefore, it is hard to derive the specific values for V a , V b , V c , and V d . It is generally very difficult to obtain the Nash equilibrium in a compact form. For this reason, we conduct extensive simulations to study the impacts of each parameter on the contributing probability p in the following section.
VI. SIMULATION EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
In our simulation study, we consider a network topology that consists of two PUs deployed in a 3 km × 3 km square area with SUs surrounding the PUs. Following the simulation setup in [33] , we set the time-bandwidth product m = 5, the PU transmit power P P U = 100 mW, the noise level σ 2 = −90 dBm, the path-loss exponent ν = 3, and the path-loss constant κ = 1. The energy consumption for spectrum sensing per time slot ξ is set to 1, and ω is set to 10.
Additionally, we set the parameter λ = 10 that determines the harshness of the penalty for free riders and the parameter μ = 10 that decides on the value of the revenue for contributors. We assume that the step sizes of adjustment for different SUs are the same, which is set to η = 0.06. The threshold for uncertainty H = 0.3. These parameters can be adjusted according to the application requirements and are listed in Table I . Note that each SU decides on whether to become a spectrum sensing contributor or a free rider based on its local utility history and selects a channel to sense based on its own estimation of the channel status; thus, our scheme is localized. Therefore, there is no need to simulate a network that contains many primary PUs/channels. We believe that a simple network described above provides sufficient insight to demonstrate the strength of our proposed scheme.
B. Simulation Results
The results reported in this section are averaged over 20 runs.
1) Detection Performance With Different Network Scales:
Our algorithm allows some of the SUs to be free riders. Comparing with the full cooperative scenario, where all the SUs participate in spectrum sensing, apparently, the number of sensing nodes in our model is smaller. Thus, the energy for spectrum sensing can be conserved. However, we also need to guarantee the detection performance for each channel. Fig. 4(a) and (b) shows the detection probability and false alarm probability for channel 1. Similarly, the detection performance for channel 2 is shown in Fig. 5(a) and (b) .
From these results, we observe that the higher the detection probability, the better the PUs are protected. As shown in Figs. 4(a) and 5(a), our algorithm achieves high detection probabilities for both channels with different network scales. Another nice feature of our algorithm is that the false alarm probabilities for both channels are effectively restrained. In Figs. 4(b) and 5(b), we can see that the false alarm probabilities are always below 0.025 for both channels. The lower the false alarm probability, the more efficiently the channel can be reutilized by SUs. With low false alarm possibilities, SUs can take advantage of almost every opportunity to transmit their data whenever the PU is absent. This is critical for guaranteeing the SUs' throughput.
2) Impact of Adjustable Parameters: Our proposed algorithm is utility based, and SUs make decisions on which action to take based on their utility history. Therefore, different parameter settings for the utility function can have different influences on the behaviors of the SUs. Here, we study the impact of these adjustable parameters on the probability that an SU chooses to become a contributor in spectrum sensing (termed contributing probability). First, we study the impact of μ. Fig. 6 (a) and (b) plots the contributing probabilities for five different users when μ = 10 and μ = 20, respectively.
The biggest difference between these two figures is the trend of the curves. The contributing probabilities for four users (users 2, 3, 4, and 5) decrease with the increase in the number of iterations when μ = 10. However, when μ = 20, the contributing probabilities for User 2 and User 3 show an upward trend after about ten iterations. This is because the value of μ determines the revenue for a contributor. With a higher μ, a contributor can get higher utility. Thus, SUs choose to become contributors at a higher frequency.
Next, we study the impact of λ. Fig. 7 shows the contributing probabilities with λ = 10 and λ = 20. We can see that with the increase in the number of iterations, the number of users that are willing to become contributors at higher probabilities increases when λ = 20. In particular, compared with λ = 10, the contributing probabilities for User 2 and User 3 when λ = 20 start to increase after about seven and ten iterations. This generally higher contributing probability in Fig. 7(b) is caused by the fact that a larger λ indicates a more severe punishment for free riders-the value of λ determines the harshness of the penalty for free riders. When SUs face a greater risk to be free riders, they tend to be contributors with higher probabilities.
Another parameter that has influence on the value of utility is the uncertainty threshold H. We illustrate the impact of H in Fig. 8 . The number of SUs that are willing to contribute with higher probabilities is larger when H = 0.1. Generally speaking, a higher contributing probability can be achieved with a lower uncertainty threshold H. Thus, we reach the following conclusion from the comparison between these two subgraphs: The higher the H, the more reluctant the SUs become in contributing to spectrum sensing. In other words, the higher the H, the higher the probability that the SUs choose to be free riders.
As we have previously introduced, if the largest uncertainty of the M channels exceeds the threshold, the free riders will be severely punished; otherwise, the punishment is light. Consequently, with a larger threshold H, the risk of being heavily punished as a free rider is reduced, and the SUs choose to be free riders with higher probabilities.
We also evaluate the impact of the step size of adjustment η. We plot the contributing probabilities with η = 0.06 and η = 0.09. As shown in Fig. 9(a) and (b) , the contributing probability decreases faster with η = 0.09. This is simply because the value of η determines the growth rate of the probabilities for different actions. In other words, η determines the slope of the curve. Therefore, Fig. 9(b) shows a greater slope with a larger η.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel idea of C3S when there exist M primary channels and N SUs. Different from existing research focusing on cooperative sensing, the SUs in our consideration have the freedom to choose whether to contribute to spectrum sensing or not. Such a mechanism can help reduce the overall energy consumption for spectrum sensing. We have also introduced the concept of uncertainty to estimate the channel status distribution. The SUs make decisions on which channel to sense based on the uncertainty of each channel, and each contributor always selects to sense the channel that brings the most information on the status distribution. This method effectively reduces the uncertainty of the channel status. According to the extensive simulation study, our scheme is proved to be effective and flexible. It achieves a high detection probability and a low false alarm probability. Moreover, different requirements can be satisfied by tuning the adjustable parameters.
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